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Abstract
We examine how bank size affects borrowers, when information asymmetry is not partic-
ularly severe. Our sample comprises 20,806 loan facilities granted to 3,625 US public firms.
After minimizing endogeneity concerns, we find that there is a positive relation between
bank size and firm value, after the origination of the loan. Firms that borrow from large
banks invest more, grow faster and have higher risk, proxied by earnings volatility. The ef-
fects are concentrated in borrowers which are ex-ante (pre-loan) safer (low leverage or high
Z-Score) and muted, but not negative, in riskier firms. We highlight the bright side of large
banks.
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1 Introduction and Related Literature
We know that large banks played a leading role in the recent global financial crisis, and their
distress has had severe negative consequences for the real economy. This has triggered an
on-going debate on the optimal size of banks resulting in a series of policy measures aimed
at reducing the risk of large or systemically important financial institutions. For example, the
Basel Committee suggests a capital surcharge of up to 2.5% on banks deemed to be systemically
important. These policies encourage banks to reduce their size or split their activities. While
the effects of bank size on systemic risk have been widely studied in the existing literature (see
e.g. Laeven et al., 2016, Bertay et al., 2013 and Brownlees and Engle, 2017), the effects of bank
size on the real outcomes of firms remain relatively unexplored. Hence, the policies motivated
by too-big-to-fail concerns may have unintended consequences for corporate borrowers. In this
paper, we empirically examine the effects of the size of the lending banks on the outcomes of
large, publicly traded borrowers.
Theory predicts that small banks have a comparative advantage in producing soft informa-
tion (Stein, 2002). Small, privately held firms face severe information asymmetry and rely on
potential lenders producing soft information for making lending decisions. This suggests that
small banks have a comparative advantage in monitoring small, privately held firms and there
is substantial evidence in support of this hypothesis (e.g., Berger et al., 2005). However, the
soft information advantage is reduced significantly when lending to large, publicly traded firms.
This observation motivates our research question. Specifically, we examine the effect of bank
size on the operating performance and investment policies of large, publicly traded borrowers in
the US. In this regard, we also contribute to an emerging literature that studies the real effects
of bank lending on firm outcomes.
Large banks benefit from their own set of advantages. The too-big-to-fail guarantees (which
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may be implicit or explicit) reduce the large banks’ cost of capital. Further, large banks benefit
from scale economies via increased cost efficiency (see e.g., Hughes and Mester, 2013 and Whee-
lock and Wilson, 2012, 2015). We conjecture that this advantage spills over into the real sector,
to the firms that borrow from large banks. Therefore, we hypothesise that bank size has a
positive effect on (large) borrower value and operating performance. We consider the following
channel. If large banks pass on some of their cost savings to their borrowers, it would reduce the
borrower’s cost of capital and increase its investment opportunities. Previously negative NPV
projects become positive NPV, due to the lower cost of capital. Therefore, firms borrowing
from large banks gain value as they invest more (in positive NPV projects).
Our sample consists of 20,806 loan facilities granted to 3,625 publicly traded US companies
between 1992 and 2015. We first assess the effect of bank size on firm’s performance. Bank size
is the total asset of the bank making the loan. Our main proxy for the firm’s performance is the
Return on Assets, ROA, which is an accounting-based measure. For robustness, we also use the
industry-adjusted variant of ROA and a market based proxy, the Tobin’s Q. We find that there
is a positive relationship between bank size and firm performance, after the origination of the
loan. A 10% increase in bank size leads to an increase in ROA by 0.8%; the magnitude of the
effect is important considering that it represents 24% of the average post-loan ROA (average
post-loan ROA is 3.3%).
In terms of firm-level investment, we find that post-loan, firm investment increases with bank
size. Both components of investment, capital expenditure and R&D spending, increase with
bank size. Additionally, post-loan volatility in earnings increases with bank size. Consistent
with higher investment, we find that firms borrowing from large banks grow faster (in terms of
total assets and sales) over the tenor of the loan. Overall, this suggests that firms in our sample
that borrow from large banks invest more and increase their risk, which (at least partially)
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explains our main results that firm performance increases with bank size. The positive link
between investment and performance is consistent with Jiang et al. (2015) who find that higher
product market competition increases investment, which leads to stronger performance.
One would expect that an increase in risk will be value-enhancing only for a subset of firms
that are operating at a lower than optimal level of risk. To test this hypothesis, we split up our
sample into ex-ante safe and risky firms (low leverage or high Z-Score firms are safer). Consistent
with our predictions, we find evidence that the observed effects are mostly concentrated in ex-
ante safer firms. The effects are generally neutral in the riskier subset of firms.
According to Berger et al. (2005), banks and firms match on size, i.e., big banks lend to
bigger firms and small banks lend to smaller firms. Another concern is that there may be a
reverse causality if firms choose which bank to borrow from based on their investment needs.
With this in mind, we take two steps: first, we restrict our sample to only large, publicly traded
US firms. Second, similar to Berger et al. (2005), we use an instrumental variable approach to
account for the endogenous choice of bank size by the borrower.
We instrument bank size with the Branching Restrictiveness Index (BRI) of Rice and Strahan
(2010). This variable captures the state’s lending environment, which we argue (partially)
determines a borrower’s choice of bank size. To be valid, an instrument should be exogenous
to the dependent variable. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) (and others, see section 4.1 for a more
detailed background) document that bank competition in the state is shaped by the power
struggles between special interest groups and the general political landscape. Therefore, the
lending environment is plausibly exogenous to our dependent variable, the borrower’s outcomes.
There is a large literature that studies the effect of bank financing on borrowers. Diamond
(1984) theoretically studies the comparative advantage of banks in resolving post-lending moral
hazard problems. James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989) and more recently, Gande and
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Saunders (2012) find empirical support that bank financing adds value to firms. These studies
treat the effect of bank financing on the borrowing firm as homogeneous across different bank
types. In contrast, in our case, the effect of bank financing varies across bank size which is a
proxy for scale effects.
There are several studies showing that bank size is an important determinant of the nature
of the bank-borrower relationship. In the context of bank lending to small firms, Berger et al.
(2005) find evidence that small banks are better able to generate and process soft information
and have stronger relationships with borrowers. As a result, small banks are relatively better
equipped to relax the credit constraints of small firms (see also, Cole et al., 2004 and DeYoung
et al., 2004). We complement this strand of the literature as we study the effect of bank
size on large, publicly traded firms. This is an important exercise as the dynamics of bank
monitoring are different in the context of lending to large, publicly traded firms. We argue
that soft information is less relevant for these firms, insomuch as they are informationally more
transparent.
Our study also relates to an emerging strand of the literature that examines the effect of the
bank-borrower relationship on borrower value (performance). Dass and Massa (2011) examine
the effect of the relationship on corporate governance (positive) and market liquidity (negative).
On balance, they find that firm value is positively affected by the bank-borrower relationship.
Qian and Yeung (2015) find that the effect of bank financing on governance depends on the
efficiency in the banking sector. Delis et al. (2016) find that bank market power positively
affects the performance of firms.
Some studies also look specifically at the effect of bank lending on corporate investment.
Chava and Purnanandam (2011) find that negative shocks to banks have real negative conse-
quences for borrowers (see also Carvalho et al., 2015). During a banking crisis, bank-dependent
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borrowers suffer larger valuation losses and subsequently experience a higher decline in their
capital expenditure and profitability. Aslan (2016) finds that lending relationships significantly
affect leverage ratios, issuance choices and investment structures in relationship borrowers.
Gonzalez (2016) finds that stronger bank competition is associated with greater reduction in
corporate investment during the crisis.
Our contribution to this strand of the literature is as follows: we show that over and above
the observable aspects of the lending relationships (such as the existing relationship, cost of
debt), unobservable factors captured by bank size (e.g., scale effects), also affect the borrower’s
outcomes such as performance and investment. Further, we link our findings to the observed
riskiness of the borrower.
2 Hypothesis Statement
The literature on soft information (e.g., Berger et al., 2005 and DeYoung et al., 2004) find
that small banks are better at collecting and processing soft information due to their simpler
structures. This comparative advantage allows small banks to lend more effectively to small,
opaque firms. However, soft information is arguably less important for large, publicly traded
firms. Publicly traded firms experience a greater level of scrutiny and are required by regulation
to meet certain disclosure standards which results in a greater level of transparency. Hence, the
asymmetric information issue is less severe for these firms.
Additionally, large banks benefit from scale effects in cost saving (see e.g., Hughes and Mester,
2013 and Wheelock and Wilson, 2012, 2015) and the too-big-to-fail guarantees. If large banks
pass on some of these savings to their borrowers, it reduces the firm’s cost of capital. This
results in increased value for firms as some previously negative NPV projects become positive
NPV and the level of investment increases.
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We state our hypothesis for large, publicly traded firms:
H1: Bank size has a positive effect on borrower value and performance, after the origination
of the loan.
H2: Bank size has a positive effect on the level of investment and risk, after the origination
of the loan.
Finally, as we hypothesise that an increase in value comes from an increase in the level
of investment (and hence, total business risk), we expect that the observed effects would be
concentrated in ex-ante safer firms. Our argument is that an increase in risk in ex-ante riskier
firms would possibly be value-destroying, rather than value-enhancing.
H3: The positive effects of bank size on firm value and investment are concentrated in ex-ante
safer firms.
The effects of Banksize on ex-ante riskier firms are unclear. If big banks indiscriminately (of
risk) allow higher risk taking, this would potentially destroy value in riskier borrowers. However,
if banks exercise discretion, i.e., pass on lower costs to safer firms only, then we expect the effects
of Banksize on riskier firms to be neutral.
3 Data
The data are compiled from several sources: the loan level data comes from the DealScan
database provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). Bank size information is obtained
from the financial statements in the BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Finally,
firm level variables are obtained from the merged CRSP/Compustat database and the I/B/E/S
database.
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3.1 Sample Construction
DealScan provides information on the loans issued to large public companies, both at the facility
level and deal level. In our study, we collect the data at the facility level and all facilities issued
to publicly listed US companies during the period 1992-2015 are initially selected. We exclude
the facilities issued to the financial services companies (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999). We drop
all facilities that are issued by non-bank financial institutions. Consequently, we end up with
a total of 20,806 facilities and 3,625 borrowers. In this sample, 2,374 companies have two or
more facilities in one year. For our regression analysis, we aggregate the facility-level data to
the firm-year level. If there are multiple facilities issued to a borrower in a particular year, we
combine them into one observation. The final sample consists of 12,217 observations.1
3.2 Linking DealScan and BankScope
Most facilities in DealScan are syndications issued by one or more lead arrangers and several
participants. We focus on lead banks because the participants have limited contributions in
originating and monitoring the loans. Following convention (see Campello and Gao, 2017), we
classify lending banks by their ultimate parents. DealScan’s Company dataset provides the
lenders company’s identifier, its parent’s identifier and its ultimate-parent’s identifier. There-
fore, we easily observe the ultimate parent of each lender.
While DealScan provides the locations and names of banks, the accounting data of banks are
not contained in it. Thus we obtain the accounting information of banks from BankScope. Since
there is no common identifier between DealScan and BankScope, we manually match these two
datasets by using the bank names and locations. The matching is initially done by the fuzzy
merge algorithm in STATA using bank names and locations. Since the fuzzy merge is based on
1The number of observations differs across regressions as necessary controls are not always available.
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a bigram string comparator, it is imperfect; so, we manually review all matching results.
We further increase our matching accuracy by checking the M&A activities of a facility-issuing
bank in the year in which the facility is granted. To implement this, we use the official M&A
records from the Chicago Fed’s website. BankScope provides the ’Bank History’ and ’Previous
Name’ variables, which show the M&A activities and name changes of a bank. We cross check
these datasets in order to achieve an accurate dynamic match across different years. Finally,
if the lender’s name is not recognizable, we identify it by tracking its subsidiaries in DealScan,
searching this name among the bank’s previous names listed in BankScope or searching online
to find news articles containing similar bank names. In this way, we link the lender ultimate-
parent identifier in DealScan to the bank identifier in BankScope, ’bvdidnum’. Since we are
interested in the ultimate parent bank’s asset, we use the consolidated financial statements in
our analysis.
We use Imperial Bank (companyid=5985) in DealScan as an example to illustrate the match-
ing process. First, we use the fuzzy merge in STATA using the bank name and bank location
(California, US), which generates the matching result, Imperial Bank (BankScope bvdidnum =
US131942440). However, after reviewing the match, we identify that the match given by the al-
gorithm is a commercial bank, not the bank holding company that we are interested in, although
it has the same name and location. Then we manually search similar names in BankScope
and find that the correct match is Imperial Bancorp (BankScope bvdidnum = US952575576)
at the BHC level. Next, we check the M&A history of this bank. We find that Comerica
Incorporated acquired Imperial Bancorp in January, 2001. Therefore, after 2001, the ultimate-
parent companyid, 5985, should be linked with Comerica Incorporated (BankScope bvdidnum =
US381998421) instead of Imperial Bancorp (BankScope bvdidnum = US952575576). Then we
check the BankScope indices under these bvdidnums (i.e. US952575576 and US381998421) and
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use the indices using consolidated financial statements. Finally, Imperial Bank is linked with
Imperial Bancorp (BankScope Index = 34570) prior to the acquisition in 2001 and Comerica
Incorporated (BankScope Index = 34043), thereafter.
3.3 Firm Characteristics
Firm-level accounting data are obtained from the Merged CRSP/Compustat database. Since
DealScan does not provide a common identifier as CRSP/Compustat, we use the DealScan-
Compustat link file provided by Michael Roberts (Chava and Roberts, 2008).
Dependent variables: Our main dependent variable is firm performance. The main proxy
for performance is the return on assets, ROA, which is the income before extraordinary items
divided by lagged assets. For robustness, we further use the industry-adjusted variant of ROA
and Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the market value
of debt over total assets. The Tobin’s Q measure is forward looking and incorporates market
expectations.
CAPEX is the ratio of the capital expenditure over the lagged asset. R&D is defined as the
research and development expense over the lagged asset. Investment is defined as the sum of
capital expenditure and R&D spending. Following convention, we replace the missing values
of R&D with 02 (e.g., Billett et al., 2006). We use the volatility of earnings, σ(EBIT ), as a
proxy for corporate risk. Finally, we consider the growth rates in Assets (log of total assets),
Employees (number of employees) and Sales.
Control variables: Firmsize is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Leverage is calcu-
lated as the long-term debt divided by total assets. To control for a firm’s internal financing
ability, we control for Cash and Cashflow, both scaled by the lagged asset. Asset Tangibility of a
2Results are unchanged if we drop the missing values of R&D, but we lose around half of the observations.
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firm will also have an impact on the firm’s financing ability and is measured as the ratio of prop-
erty, plant and equipment over lagged assets. The firm’s investment opportunity is represented
by Market-to-Book, defined as the ratio of market equity over book equity. Analyst is obtained
from the I/B/E/S Summary database and is defined as the number of analysts following the
stock. Credit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrowing firm has a credit rating, which
implies access to alternate debt financing and 0, when it does not have a credit rating.
Following Bharath et al. (2007), Relm,k is a dummy variable and captures the existence of
a relationship between a bank, k and a firm, m, in the 5 years previous to the current facility.
It equals 1 if there is a pre-existing relationship and 0, otherwise. Finally, we include all terms
of loans (spread, number of covenants, whether the loan is secured or not and maturity) as
controls.
Instruments: We instrument our main independent variable, Banksize, with the state-level
Branching Restrictiveness Index (BRI ) of Rice and Strahan (2010). BRI is an index of interstate
branching restrictions that ranges from zero (least restrictive) to four (most restrictive). We
take the time-weighted average BRI over the sample period as this reflects the intensity at
which state regulators removed restrictions, reflecting the state’s environment (see Table (1)).
We discuss the inclusion and exclusion restrictions in Section 4.1.
[Table 1]
3.4 Bank Characteristics
Our main independent variable is Banksize. We denote Banksizem for a borrower m as the total
assets of its lender. Following convention (see Campello and Gao, 2017), we classify lending
banks by their ultimate parents. As with the other independent variables, it is averaged over
[t − n, t − 1]. t is the start of a loan facility and the n refers to the tenor (or duration) of the
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facility. Further, if a facility contains multiple lead banks, we compute the average size of the
lead banks. We focus on the lead banks to avoid including banks that have limited contribution
in a specific facility. Wherever the contribution of each lead bank to the facility is available, we
take the weighted average instead of the simple average. Suppose that there are K lead banks
indexed by k, in the borrower m’s facility,
Banksizem =
K∑
k=1
(loan amount)k
total loan
∗ (total asset)k (1)
If the loan amount that each bank contributes towards the loan facility is not available, the
weight is simply 1K . Bank assets are measured in millions and we take the natural log of this
variable in all regressions.
We also control for a number of bank level variables in our regressions. We use the Income
Diversity (fraction of income in interest relative to non-interest) and Activity Diversity (fraction
of earning assets in loans relative to non-loans) of Laeven and Levine, 2007 (see also Goetz et
al., 2013). We also include Bank Capital and the log of the Bank Operating Income.
Finally, we control for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI ) of commercial bank deposit
concentration for the state in which the borrower operates. HHI measures the competition in
the local credit market.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the main variables are shown in Table 2.
[Table 2]
We focus on large, publicly listed US firms and over half of the firms in our sample are listed
on the NYSE. However, we still see a significant variation in Firmsize. The range of bank sizes
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is even larger, from $213.2 billion in total assets at the 25th percentile of the distribution to
$1029.1 billion in total assets at the 75th percentile. Therefore, although these banks appear in
our sample because a large firm has borrowed from them, they are not exclusively large banks.
This variance in bank size allows us to investigate the effect of different bank size on big firm’s
post-loan outcomes. On average, the post-loan ROA is 3.3% and the firm’s investment is around
8% of its assets, over the tenor of the loan.
4 Research Design
4.1 Instrumenting Banksize
Evidence suggests (and we verify) that banks and firms match on size, i.e., large firms borrow
from large banks and small firms borrow from small banks. To make causal statements regarding
the effect of bank size on borrower outcomes we need to minimize the bias arising as a result.
Following Berger et al. (2005), we employ an instrumental variables approach to minimize the
endogeneity issue.
Instrument Relevance:
A good instrumental variable (IV) should have a high correlation with the endogenous regressor
(Banksize). We instrument Banksize with BRI which reflects the (borrowing firm’s) state’s
lending environment and therefore affects the firm’s choice of bank size. In Section 5.1, we
report tests to show that our instrument is strong.
Exclusion restriction:
To be valid, the instrument should have no correlation with the dependent variable (borrower
ROA or Investment) unless through the variables that we explicitly control for. Our instrument,
BRI, reflects the competition in the banking sector in the (borrowing firm’s) state. In order to
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argue the exogeneity of our instrument with respect to borrower outcomes we briefly discuss
below the evolution of bank competition in US states:
Until the early 1970s most US states had intra-state and inter-state branching restrictions,
which have gradually been removed over the years. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) relate the
origins of the branching restrictions to the generation of revenues by state governments in the
form of charter licence fees paid by (locally chartered) banks. Economides et al. (1996) show
that for decades, small banks successfully lobbied for stricter branching restriction in order to
protect themselves against larger, more efficient banks. Then, in the 1970s and 80s, technological
advances made local banking less valuable. Further, the political landscape changed as the
Savings and Loans crisis of the 1980s changed the public perception towards the branching
restriction laws, since they prohibited the emergence of a more resilient banking sector (Strahan,
2003).
These factors contributed to removing the branching restrictions over time, culminating in
the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which effectively removes
all restrictions on interstate banking at the national level (states were free to implement this
law at their own pace). Thus, we argue that competition in the banking sector in the state
(both the origins of the restrictions and eventual deregulations) is shaped by power struggles
between special interest groups and also the prevailing political landscape. Important for our
identification, the deregulations are arguably exogenous to firm-level outcomes.
4.2 2SLS regression analysis
Our set-up is similar to Dass and Massa (2011). We conduct a cross-sectional analysis at the
firm level. We observe the facility level data but if a firm has multiple facilities over a year, we
combine the facilities into a single observation for the firm in that year. The dependent variables
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are the borrower’s post-loan outcome, averaged over the tenor of the loan (during [t+ 1, t+ n]
years). Firm-level characteristics (averaged over [t−n, t−1] years) are used as controls. t is the
start of a loan facility and the n refers to the tenor (or duration) of the facility. The pre-loan
average (over [t − n, t − 1] years) of the dependent variable is included as a control. As Dass
and Massa (and also Delis et al., 2016) point out, the autocorrelation issue that arises in panels
when the lagged dependent variable is on the right hand side is eliminated in this set-up because
the sampling is event-based. We are not using a true panel, since loan facilities are unique and
not repeated in time. Instead we use a cross section of loan facilities across banks and firms.
We employ an instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) method to minimize
the endogeneity in the regressors. In the first-stage, we regress Banksize on the instrumental
variables and the other firm-level control variables.
Banksizei,[t−n,t−1] = γZi,j + µXi,[t−n,t−1] + α+ ui,[t−n,t−1] (2)
The vector, Zi,j , contains the instrument, BRI belonging to the state, j, in which the borrower,
i, operates. The fitted value of Banksize from the first stage is used in the second stage as the
independent variable.
DepV ari,[t+1,t+n] = β ˆBanksizei,[t−n,t−1] + θXi,[t−n,t−1] + γj + δt + i,[t−n,t−1] (3)
The X vector contains the firm level control variables such as Firmsize, Leverage and others
discussed in the previous section. We include industry fixed effects, γj using the 12 Fama-French
industry classifications (Fama and French, 1997). We include time fixed effects, δt which is a
dummy for each year in the sample. Finally, we cluster all standard errors at the firm level. All
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize the effect of that outliers.
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5 Results
5.1 Instrument Relevance
[Table 3]
First, we evaluate the relevance of our instrument and appropriateness of the model we use.
In Table (3), we present the coefficients on Firmsize and the instrument, BRI from the first
stage of the IV-2SLS3. As expected, the sign of the Firmsize coefficient is positive and statis-
tically significant, indicating that large firms borrow from large banks. The coefficient on the
instrumental variable is significant at the 1% (t-statistic = 4.33) level, implying that the instru-
ment sufficiently predicts the borrower’s choice of bank size. The partial F-statistic is 18.7 and
significant at the 1% level, so we reject the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak. The
Wu-Hausman test (from the second stage) checks whether the OLS and IV-2SLS models give
us similar results. We reject the null hypothesis (the F-statistic is 11.8 and significant at the
1% level), indicating that Banksize is an endogenous regressor and the IV-2SLS model should
be used.
5.2 Value Effects
[Figure 1]
We first present visual evidence (in Figure (1)) that there is a positive relation between Banksize
and firm performance. We plot the average post-loan firm ROA for each quartile of Banksize.
The average post-loan firm ROA monotonically increases with Banksize and the difference be-
tween the two extreme quartiles is 0.019 (t-statistic= 8.825). Of course, the visual representation
is merely suggestive as we do not control for other factors affecting post-loan performance.
3We suppress the other coefficients in the output. Available on request.
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In Table (4) we present the results for our main hypothesis (H1) and examine the effect of
bank size on firm performance.
[Table 4]
In Column (1), we present our results for our baseline proxy of firm performance, ROA.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that an increase in bank size improves firm value,
after adjusting for the selection bias. There is a positive relation between Banksize and firm
performance, ROA and the relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level (coefficient =
0.083 and t-statistic = 2.33). In terms of economic significance, a 10% increase in bank size
leads to an increase in ROA by 0.8%, indicating that firms borrowing from large banks are more
profitable, after the origination of the loan. The magnitude of the effect is large; given that
the average post-loan ROA in our sample is 3.3%, a 0.8% increase in ROA is 24% of the mean.
These findings lend credence to our hypothesis that large banks add value to their borrowers.
We use two additional proxies for firm value. In Columns (2) and (3), we use the industry-
adjusted ROA and the Tobin’s Q, respectively, as a proxy for firm performance. The results are
qualitatively unchanged. A 10% increase in bank size increases the post-loan Tobin’s Q by 8%,
which indicates that the market positively views loans from large banks and updates the firm’s
growth prospects.
In terms of the control variables, the coefficient on Firmsize is negative. The coefficient on
Rel is not significant for the ROA measures and is negative and significant for Tobin’s Q. This
indicates that whether or not a firm has an existing relationship with a bank or not does not
positively affect its post-loan performance. This is consistent with theory, as we do not expect
the firms in our sample to benefit from on-going relationships with banks, due to lower levels
of information asymmetry and access to alternate sources of funding. Predictably, stricter loan
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terms such as a higher interest spread on loans and higher collateral requirements, are negatively
associated with firm performance. Bank characteristics are also statistically important.
5.3 Investment Effects
In this section, we examine the investment effects of Banksize (H2). First, we examine the effect
of Banksize on the level of investment and firm risk-taking in Table (5).
[Table 5]
In Columns (1)-(3), we examine how Banksize affects the level of firm investment. An increase
in Banksize is associated with an increase in the level of post-loan Investment (sum of capital
expenditure and R&D spending). In terms of economic magnitude, a 10% increase in Banksize
is associated with a 0.5% increase in the level of investment. The result also holds for each
component of Investment (CAPEX and R&D spending), separately.
In Column (4), we examine how Banksize affects the volatility of earnings, σ(EBIT ), which
is our proxy for firm risk-taking. An increase in Banksize increases the volatility of EBIT (the
coefficient on Banksize is positive and significant at 10%). This result is consistent with the
findings above that firms increase their level of investment.
How does a higher level of investment affect a firm’s growth rate? We check this in Table (6).
[Table 6]
Consistent with the observed investment effects, there is a positive relation between Banksize
and a firm’s growth rate. A 10% increase in Banksize increases the post-loan growth rate of
firms by around 2.2% (in terms of firms assets). The coefficient on Banksize is positive for three
proxies that we use but only statistically significant for the asset and sales proxies.
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This ties in well with our main results that firm performance increases with Banksize and
sheds light on one of the channels driving our main findings: it appears that an increase in bank
size allows firms to invest more and take more risk. This results in a faster growth rate in firms
and ultimately, higher value for the borrower.
5.4 Effects across Different Types of Firms
In this section we test our final hypothesis that the observed effects will be mainly concentrated
in firms that are ex-ante safer (H3).
In Table (7), we split up firms into low (safe) and high (risky) leverage subsets. We report
the coefficient on Banksize for each dependent variable.
[Table 7]
While the value effects are positive for both subsets sorted by ex-ante firm leverage, the effects
are stronger (bigger magnitude) and statistically significant only in the low leverage (safe) subset
of firms. Specifically, in the low leverage sub-sample, a 10% increase in Banksize leads to an
increase in ROA by 2%, which is more than double the magnitude of the effect in the full sample.
Next we turn to the investment effects. In the low leverage sub-sample, the effect of Banksize
is positive and significant for all three proxies of investment. However, in the high leverage
sub-sample, the coefficient on Banksize in any of the investment regressions is not statistically
significant. This suggests that investment increases with Banksize only in the low leverage
(safer) sub-sample.
Similarly, in Table (8), we split up firms into low (risky) and high (safe) Z-Score subsets. We
report the coefficient on Banksize for each dependent variable.
[Table 8]
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The value effect is positive and statistically significant in the high Z-Score (safe) sub-sample
only; it is still positive, but statistically insignificant in the low Z-Score firms. The investment
effects also concentrate only in the high Z-Score firms. Banksize is positively and statistically
significantly (5% level) related to earnings volatility in the high Z-Score firms; it is negative,
but not statistically significant in the low Z-Score firms.
Overall, consistent with our predictions, the above results indicate that large banks add value
to the ex-ante safe borrowers by encouraging (or allowing) them to invest more and take more
risk. For riskier firms, whose risk taking is likely above the optimal level, the investment effects
are muted or absent and the value effects are neutral. Importantly, the value effect of Banksize
for the riskier firms is not negative.
6 Robustness
6.1 Instrument Variation
In the baseline, we take the time-weighted average BRI over the sample period as this reflects the
intensity at which state regulators removed restrictions. In this section, we add more variation
to our instrument by making it time varying at the state level (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2017).
Additionally, we cluster the errors at the state-year level to account for any common element
to the regression errors across the firms operating in the same state 4. We show the results in
Table (9) and report the coefficient on Banksize for each dependent variable.
[Table 9]
The results remain generally consistent with the baseline. The value effects are economically
of similar magnitude as the baseline and are statistically stronger (all three proxies are statis-
4The results remain qualitatively unaffected compared to the case when we cluster the errors at the firm-level.
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tically significant at the 1% level). In terms of the investment effects, Investment and CAPEX
are positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. R&D spending and the risk proxy
σ(EBIT ) are still positive, but are no longer statistically significant.
6.2 Geographical factors
There is evidence that bank lending varies significantly across US states (Benmelech et al.,
2017). It would be problematic to interpret our results if firms of a certain size are clustered in
certain states. Rice and Strahan (2010) find that there is no correlation between the structure
of the non-banking industry (share of small firms) and the deregulation index. Specifically,
they find that the correlation between the share of small firms in the state and the branching
deregulation index is .16 and is not statistically significant
However, there are many other state specific factors that may affect both the demand and
supply of credit. Below, we examine the possibility that state-specific macroeconomic factors
may influence the value and investment effects of Banksize. We show the results in Table (10)
and report the coefficients on Banksize for each dependent variable.
[Table 10]
First, in Column (1), we include the growth rate in the Coincident index for the state in which
the borrower is head-quartered.5 By including the growth rate in the Coincident index in the
regressions, we controls for the state’s macroeconomic conditions. The coefficients on Banksize
for all dependent variables remain positive and statistically significant.
Next, we augment the model by interacting Banksize with the growth rate in the state
5The Coincident index combine four state-level indicators including non-farm payroll employment, average
hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disburse-
ments deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The trend for each state’s index is set to the trend of its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), so long-term growth in the state’s index matches the long-term growth in its GDP.
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Coincident index. In addition to the coefficient on Banksize (Column (2)), we report the
coefficient on the interaction term in Column (3). The stand-alone effect of Banksize on each
dependent variable remains positive and statistically significant. Importantly, the interaction
term is not statistically significant for any of the dependent variables. This indicates that
the value and investment effects of Banksize do not vary with state-specific macroeconomic
conditions.
In Column (4), we use the time-varying version of the instrument and include state fixed
effects (in addition to the industry and time fixed effects). The value effects are still consistent
(positive and statistically significant at 5% or 10%). The investment effects lose statistical
power. Our instrument is at the state-year level and for the majority of the states the instrument
does not vary much over time, e.g., for Alaska, the index equals 2 from 1994-2009, when it is
set equal to 0 due to the Dodd-Frank Act. This implies that the state fixed effects and our
instrument are highly correlated. Therefore, including state fixed effects in the regressions
removes most of the variation from the instrument. Hence, when we add the state fixed effects,
some of our results are no longer consistent.
Finally, we test whether geographic proximity between the bank and the borrower affects
our results. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017), we construct a dummy variable, MSA, which
equals 1 if the borrower borrows from at least one bank operating in the same MSA and 0,
otherwise.6 We augment the baseline by including the MSA dummy and its interaction with
Banksize. In addition to the coefficient on Banksize (Column (5)), we report the coefficient
on the interaction term in Column (6). Both value and investment effects are positive and
statistically significant (only σ(EBIT ) is marginally insignificant with a t-statistic of 1.61).
The interaction term is consistently insignificant for all dependent variables. This indicates
6We use the zip codes provided by DealScan and the link table between zip codes and Core Based Statistical
Areas sourced from the USA CSBA Database to identify the Metropolis Statistical Area (MSA) in which the
borrower and lenders are located.
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that geographic proximity between the borrower and lender does not explain the relationship
between Banksize and borrower outcomes.
6.3 Further Robustness
In Table (11), we present some additional robustness tests. We report the coefficient on Banksize
for each dependent variable.
[Table 11]
In Column (1), we report the results for the period 2000-2010, following Delis et al. (2016).
This is to avoid the effects arising from regulatory reforms before 2000 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 and other earlier ones) and in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010). All coefficients are
consistent with the baseline. In terms of statistical significance, the value effects are strong.
CAPEX increases with Banksize (statistically significant at 5%), but the effect of Banksize on
R&D spending and the risk proxy are no longer statistically significant.
In Column (2), instead of taking the average size of the banks in the syndicate, we use the
size of the largest bank in the syndicate as our measure of Banksize. All coefficients remain
consistent with the baseline and are statistically significant. Finally, in Column (3), instead of
taking the averages over the tenor of the loan, we use the firm outcomes in the year after the
loan origination as the dependent variable and the firm controls are lagged by one year.7 The
results remain qualitatively robust.
7Essentially, in our IV-2SLS regressions, we replace the n with 1.
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7 Conclusion
We examine the effect of bank size on borrower outcomes, when information asymmetry prob-
lems are not severe. We focus on large, publicly traded firms, which is an important departure
from the soft information literature. Using a sample of 20,806 loan facilities granted to 3,625
publicly traded US companies between 1992-2015, we find that there is a positive relation be-
tween bank size and firm value, after minimizing the potential selection bias. Firms that borrow
from large banks invest more. These firms have higher earnings volatility and grow faster. The
effects are concentrated in borrowers that are ex-ante (pre-loan) safer. The effects are muted
in riskier firms, and are still positive, but not statistically significant.
Our results have important policy implications. There is ample evidence with regards to the
negative costs that large banks impose on the system. Politicians and central bankers have
called for the break up of large banks to limit these costs. We find evidence that large banks
are able to add value when lending to large, publicly traded firms. We highlight the bright side
of bank size, which presents the regulator with a trade-off in determining the optimal bank size.
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8 Appendix
Table 1: State-wise BRI Scores
Borrower’s State BRI Score Borrower’s State BRI Score
Alabama 2.458 Nebraska 3
Alaska 1.667 Nevada 2.375
Arizona 2.042 New Hampshire 1.417
Arkansas 3 New Jersey 1.25
British Columbia 3 New Mexico 2.417
California 2.375 New York 1.917
Colorado 3 North Carolina 0.5
Connecticut 1.125 North Dakota 1.875
Delaware 2.375 Ohio 0.833
Florida 2.458 Oklahoma 1.75
Georgia 2.458 Ontario 3
Hawaii 1.333 Oregon 2.458
Idaho 2.375 Pennsylvania 0.5
Illinois 1.708 Puerto Rico 3
Indiana 1.333 Rhode Island 0.5
Iowa 3 South Carolina 2.417
Kansas 3 South Dakota 2.417
Kentucky 2.583 Tennessee 1.583
Louisiana 2.458 Texas 2.083
Maine 0.833 Utah 1.375
Maryland 0.5 Vermont 1
Massachusetts 1.25 Virginia 0.5
Michigan 0.5 Washington 2
Minnesota 2.458 West Virginia 1.375
Mississippi 3 Wisconsin 2.417
Missouri 3 Wyoming 2.458
Montana 3
The Riegle-Neal Act removed the inter-state bank-branching restrictions in 1994. We assume the pre-1994 BRI
to be 4 for all states. After the Riegle-Neal legislation, states began deregulations, which are listed in Johnson
and Rice (2008) and Rice and Strahan (2010). Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (section 613) removed any
remaining restrictions and we set BRI to 0 for all states.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
n mean 25th pctile median 75th pctile std dev
Dependent Variable
ROA[t+1,t+n] 10204 0.033 0.008 0.039 0.071 0.073
Industry-Adj ROA[t+1,t+n] 10201 0.005 -0.027 0.005 0.042 0.078
TobinsQ[t+1,t+n] 9758 1.564 1.099 1.357 1.783 0.714
Investment[t+1,t+n] 10193 0.080 0.035 0.060 0.100 0.069
CAPEX[t+1,t+n] 10193 0.064 0.026 0.045 0.077 0.063
R&D[t+1,t+n] 12217 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.034
σ(EBIT)[t+1,t+3] 8885 0.033 0.010 0.021 0.041 0.036
Asset Growth[t+1,t+n] 10183 0.094 -0.006 0.061 0.148 0.193
Employee Growth[t+1,t+n] 9999 0.046 -0.031 0.020 0.091 0.158
Sale Growth[t+1,t+n] 10194 0.097 0.006 0.066 0.149 0.180
Loan Characteristics
Loanspread 12217 4.916 4.413 5.011 5.521 0.798
Maturity(months) 12217 49.099 36.000 58.000 60.000 19.083
Collateral 12217 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.481
Covenant Number 12217 1.414 0.000 1.333 2.000 1.247
Relationship 12217 0.728 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.445
Bank Characteristics
Bank Asset ($bil) 12217 684.614 213.194 564.772 1029.062 541.159
Bank Size[t-n,t-1] 12217 12.990 12.270 13.244 13.844 1.121
Bank Income Diversity[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.746 0.679 0.765 0.839 0.123
Bank Asset Diversity[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.613 0.524 0.625 0.717 0.147
Bank Capital[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.075 0.063 0.080 0.092 0.023
Bank Operating Income[t-n,t-1] 12217 8.172 7.568 8.336 8.900 0.994
Firm Characteristics
Firmsize[t-n,t-1] 12217 6.981 5.792 6.962 8.160 1.746
Leverage[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.248 0.119 0.194 0.347 0.170
Cash[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.095 0.020 0.051 0.122 0.119
Cash Flow[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.092 0.057 0.091 0.134 0.078
Market-to-Book [t-n,t-1] 12217 2.581 1.395 2.049 3.115 2.521
ROA[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.040 0.013 0.043 0.078 0.075
Tangibility[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.673 0.329 0.596 0.955 0.427
CAPEX[t-n,t-1] 12217 0.077 0.031 0.053 0.090 0.080
Analysts[t-n,t-1] 12217 5.152 0.000 3.433 8.224 5.691
NYSE 12217 0.575 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.494
Credit Dummy 12217 0.532 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499
ZScore[t-n,t-1] 7922 37.740 2.572 4.228 8.546 186.314
State Characteristics
HHI 12217 0.123 0.055 0.097 0.156 0.100
Coincidence Index 11905 0.025 0.014 0.029 0.039 0.021
MSA 12217 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.229
BRIndex 12217 1.794 1.300 2.000 2.400 0.765
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of key variables employed in our estimation. We winsorize all data at
the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Figure 1: Average Post-loan ROA and Bank Size Quartiles.
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Table 3: First Stage
Banksize
BRIndex 0.036∗∗∗
(4.33)
Firmsize 0.098∗∗∗
(14.78)
Observations 10204
Control Variables Yes
Industry, Year fe Yes
Partial F-test 18.746∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman 11.829∗∗∗
This table presents the first stage of the IV-2SLS regression of post-loan firm performance (ROA) on Banksize.
The coefficients of BRIndex and Firmsize are reported in the table and the other control variables are included.
Banksize is the logarithm of the lender’s total assets averaged over [t−n, t−1]. All control variables are averaged
over [t − n, t − 1]. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm-level identifier. The Partial F-Statistic is from
the first stage of the IV-2SLS and evaluates the relevance of the instruments. The Wu-Hausman test (from the
second stage) checks whether the OLS and IV-2SLS models give us similar results. * Significant at 10% level. **
Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Bank Size and Profitability
ROA Industry −AdjROA TobinsQ
(1) (2) (3)
Banksize 0.083∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.801∗∗
(2.33) (2.02) (2.14)
Firmsize -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(-3.26) (-2.97) (-2.91)
ROA 0.195∗∗∗
(2.89)
Industry-Adj ROA 0.383∗∗∗
(8.10)
TobinsQ 0.523∗∗∗
(20.97)
Leverage 0.005 0.009 -0.024
(0.44) (0.86) (-0.21)
Cash -0.008 -0.006 0.067
(-0.64) (-0.52) (0.55)
Cash Flow 0.015 -0.159∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗
(0.21) (-3.21) (-4.10)
Market-to-Book 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(3.66) (4.18)
Tangibility 0.007 0.009∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(1.61) (2.32) (2.36)
CAPEX -0.070∗∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.513∗∗∗
(-3.42) (-1.89) (-3.11)
Rel -0.007∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(-2.13) (-1.78) (-2.62)
Analysts 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(5.19) (5.04) (2.12)
NYSE 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003
(6.37) (6.31) (0.10)
Credit Dummy -0.006∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.016
(-2.34) (-2.54) (0.60)
Loanspread -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(-10.48) (-10.51) (-5.47)
Maturity -0.005 -0.005 -0.095∗∗
(-1.20) (-1.29) (-2.25)
Collateral -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.001
(-2.27) (-2.53) (-0.06)
Covenant Number 0.001 0.001 -0.019∗
(0.82) (0.84) (-1.76)
HHI -0.008 -0.012 -0.022
(-0.90) (-1.27) (-0.22)
Bank Income Diversity -0.013 -0.006 0.070
(-1.09) (-0.56) (0.64)
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Bank Asset Diversity -0.071∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.621∗∗
(-2.63) (-2.34) (-2.20)
Bank Capital 0.669∗∗ 0.565∗∗ 5.899∗∗
(2.44) (2.08) (2.04)
Bank Operating Income -0.043∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.435∗∗
(-2.16) (-1.88) (-2.08)
BRI from 1st stage 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(4.33) (5.28) (4.92)
Observations 10204 10179 9516
Industry, Year fe Yes Yes Yes
Partial F-test 18.746∗∗∗ 18.240∗∗∗ 15.927∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman 11.829∗∗∗ 8.197 ∗∗∗ 13.034∗∗∗
This table presents the second stage of the IV-2SLS regression of post-loan firm performance (Profitability) on
Banksize. Banksize is the logarithm of the lender’s total assets averaged over [t−n, t−1]. All control variables are
averaged over [t−n, t− 1]. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm-level identifier. The BRI from 1st stage is
the coefficient of the instrument variable, BRIndex, obtained from the first stage of IV regression. The Partial
F-Stat is from the first stage of the IV-2SLS and evaluates the relevance of the instruments. The Wu-Hausman
test (from the second stage) checks whether the OLS and IV-2SLS models give us similar results. * Significant
at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 5: Bank Size, Investment and Risk
Investment CAPEX R&D σ(EBIT )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Banksize 0.053∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.019∗ 0.023∗
(1.99) (1.94) (1.84) (1.71)
Firmsize -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(-3.18) (-3.15) (-2.01) (-3.84)
Investment 0.389∗∗∗
(18.77)
CAPEX 0.303∗∗∗
(12.56)
R&D 0.602∗∗∗
(25.92)
σ(EBIT) 0.147∗∗∗
(6.77)
ROA -0.214∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.014
(-4.25) (-4.69) (1.01) (-0.56)
Leverage -0.013 -0.002 -0.004∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(-1.49) (-0.26) (-1.79) (-3.80)
Cash 0.021∗∗ -0.008 0.008∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(2.44) (-1.19) (2.01) (3.77)
Cash Flow 0.147∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.019
(2.83) (4.19) (-2.65) (0.73)
Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.11) (-0.57) (0.27) (1.14)
Tangibility 0.020∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(5.72) (7.95) (1.47) (1.44)
Rel -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗
(-3.64) (-2.86) (-2.46) (-1.90)
Analysts 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(1.19) (0.44) (4.21) (-1.25)
NYSE -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-0.24) (0.39) (0.08) (-0.58)
Credit Dummy 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.17) (0.08) (-1.13) (-0.67)
Loanspread -0.006∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(-4.29) (-3.82) (-4.10) (3.28)
Maturity -0.011∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(-3.65) (-2.80) (-3.24) (-2.49)
Collateral 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.98) (1.52) (3.60)
Covenant Number -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002∗∗∗
(-3.17) (-2.74) (0.64) (-4.74)
HHI -0.001 -0.011∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.005
(-0.07) (-1.65) (2.63) (-1.11)
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Bank Income Diversity -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(-0.36) (-0.17) (-0.69) (0.04)
Bank Asset Diversity -0.034∗ -0.032∗ -0.008 -0.014
(-1.74) (-1.90) (-1.09) (-1.40)
Bank Capital 0.388∗ 0.331∗ 0.158∗ 0.159
(1.89) (1.81) (1.87) (1.51)
Bank Operating Income -0.032∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.013∗
(-2.13) (-2.02) (-1.96) (-1.79)
BRI from 1st stage 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(5.00) (4.95) (4.82) (5.54)
Observations 10193 10193 12217 8352
Industry, time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial F-test 16.348∗∗∗ 16.043∗∗∗ 15.329∗∗∗ 20.917∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman 9.039∗∗∗ 8.002∗∗∗ 6.090∗∗ 4.735∗∗
This table presents the second-stage results of the IV-2SLS regressions of firm investment on Banksize. The
dependent variables are defined as the borrower’s Investment (Column (1)), CAPEX (Column (2)), R&D
spending (Column (3)) or σ(EBIT) (Column (4)), averaged over [t + 1, t + n]. The main independent variable,
Banksize, is the logarithm of the lender’s total assets averaged over [t−n, t−1]. All control variables are averaged
over [t − n, t − 1]. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The BRI from 1st stage is the coefficient of
the instrument variable, BRIndex, obtained from the first stage of the IV regression. The Partial F-Statistic is
from the first stage of the IV-2SLS and evaluates the relevance of the instruments. The Wu-Hausman test (from
the second stage) checks whether the OLS and IV-2SLS models give us similar results. * Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 6: Bank Size and Firm Growth Rate
Assets Employees Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Banksize 0.218∗∗ 0.104 0.161∗
(2.05) (1.32) (1.67)
Firmsize -0.045∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(-4.10) (-3.70) (-3.95)
ROA 0.137 0.108 0.260∗∗
(1.05) (1.10) (2.17)
Leverage -0.012 0.017 -0.001
(-0.40) (0.74) (-0.03)
Cash 0.045 0.062∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(1.59) (2.89) (4.74)
Cash Flow -0.106 -0.037 -0.327∗∗
(-0.77) (-0.34) (-2.37)
Market-to-Book 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(3.03) (2.13) (2.08)
Tangibility 0.010 -0.021∗∗ 0.010
(0.86) (-2.25) (0.85)
CAPEX 0.045 0.129∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.92) (3.07) (2.38)
Rel -0.006 -0.000 -0.005
(-0.61) (-0.01) (-0.59)
Analysts 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(1.91) (1.65) (1.91)
NYSE 0.025∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(3.32) (2.82) (3.30)
Credit Dummy -0.012 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.63) (-0.45) (-0.36)
Loanspread -0.018∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.007∗
(-3.64) (-2.95) (-1.65)
Maturity -0.023∗∗ -0.012 -0.023∗∗
(-1.99) (-1.35) (-2.08)
Collateral 0.008 0.005 0.009
(1.03) (1.03) (1.39)
Covenant Number -0.005 -0.002 -0.004
(-1.55) (-0.66) (-1.21)
HHI -0.004 0.003 -0.030
(-0.11) (0.14) (-1.13)
Bank Income Diversity -0.024 -0.059∗∗ -0.057∗∗
(-0.79) (-2.49) (-1.97)
Bank Asset Diversity -0.158∗∗ -0.061 -0.084
(-2.02) (-1.10) (-1.23)
Bank Capital 1.619∗∗ 0.687 1.169
(2.02) (1.17) (1.60)
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Bank Operating Income -0.126∗∗ -0.062 -0.097∗
(-2.10) (-1.41) (-1.80)
BRI from 1st stage 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(5.08) (5.07) (5.06)
Observations 10183 9999 10194
Industry, time fe Yes Yes Yes
Partial F-test 16.909∗∗∗ 16.866∗∗∗ 16.781∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman 8.362∗∗∗ 2.919∗ 5.109∗∗
This table presents the second-stage results of the IV-2SLS regressions of firm growth rates on Banksize. The
dependent variables are defined as the borrower’s asset growth rate (Column (1)), employee growth rate (Column
(2)) or sales growth rate (Column (3)), averaged over [t+ 1, t+ n]. The main independent variable, Banksize, is
the logarithm of lender’s total assets averaged over [t−n, t−1]. All control variables are averaged over [t−n, t−1].
Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. ***
Significant at 1% level.
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Table 7: Sub-samples Based on Leverage Ratio
Dependent Var Low Leverage High Leverage
(1) (2)
ROA 0.207∗∗ 0.008
(2.17) (0.19)
IndustryAdj ROA 0.190∗∗ -0.007
(2.20) (-0.16)
TobinsQ 2.225∗ 0.228
(1.90) (0.65)
Investment 0.128∗ 0.015
(1.87) (0.50)
CAPEX 0.103∗ 0.022
(1.80) (0.75)
R&D 0.052∗ -0.001
(1.65) (-0.06)
σ(EBIT ) 0.036 0.015
(1.53) (0.76)
This table presents a summary of the second stage results when we divide the sample into two subsamples based
on the leverage ratios of borrowers. In each column we show the second stage coefficients on Banksize for each
dependent variable. In Column (1), the leverage ratios of the borrowers are lower than the median value (0.19)
of the whole sample. In Column (2), the leverage ratios of the borrowers are relatively higher (above 0.19). Year
and industry fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. * Significant at 10%
level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 8: Sub-samples based on Z-Score
Dependent Var Low Z-Score High Z-Score
(1) (2)
ROA 0.176 0.103∗∗
(0.62) (2.10)
IndustryAdj ROA 0.124 0.094∗
(0.51) (1.90)
TobinsQ 1.545 0.718
(0.62) (1.40)
Investment 0.017 0.059∗∗
(0.16) (2.10)
CAPEX 0.053 0.035
(0.50) (1.52)
R&D 0.011 0.027∗
(0.28) (1.90)
σ(EBIT ) -0.046 0.045∗∗
(-0.45) (2.15)
This table presents a summary of the second stage results when we divide the sample into two subsamples based
on ZScore. In each column we show the second stage coefficients on Banksize for each dependent variable. In
Column (1), we include the firms with low ZScore. In Column (2), we include the firms with high ZScore. Year
and industry fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. * Significant at 10%
level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 9: Time-varying BRI
Dependent Var Time-varying BRI
ROA 0.088∗∗∗
(2.82)
IndustryAdj ROA 0.082∗∗∗
(2.59)
TobinsQ 0.738∗∗∗
(2.65)
Investment 0.035∗
(1.73)
CAPEX 0.032∗
(1.79)
R&D 0.011
(1.32)
σ(EBIT ) 0.008
(0.69)
This table presents a summary of the second stage results when using the time-varying BRI as the instrument
variable. In each column we show the second stage coefficients on Banksize for each dependent variable. Year
and industry fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. * Significant at
10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 10: Geographical Variation
Dependent Var SCI SCI interaction State FE Same MSA
Banksize Interaction Banksize Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA 0.091∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.378 0.106∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.004
(2.41) (2.35) (0.58) (2.03) (2.14) (0.06)
IndustryAdj ROA 0.078∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.376 0.120∗∗ 0.061∗ -0.033
(2.11) (2.06) (0.60) (2.12) (1.68) (-0.46)
TobinsQ 0.829∗∗ 0.853∗∗ 1.498 0.771∗ 0.824∗∗ 0.123
(2.18) (2.14) (0.29) (1.71) (2.05) (0.31)
Investment 0.056∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.599 0.002 0.062∗∗ 0.045
(2.05) (2.03) (1.18) (0.07) (2.12) (0.98)
CAPEX 0.048∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.589 0.003 0.054∗∗ 0.037
(1.98) (1.96) (1.23) (0.09) (2.08) (0.94)
R&D 0.019∗ 0.022∗ 0.187 -0.004 0.020∗ 0.006
(1.78) (1.73) (1.08) (-0.29) (1.80) (0.62)
σ(EBIT ) 0.026∗ 0.027∗ 0.157 -0.017 0.022 -0.012
(1.86) (1.86) (0.48) (-0.64) (1.61) (-0.42)
This table presents a summary of the second stage results when considering the geographical variation of the
loans. In each column we show the second stage coefficients on Banksize for each dependent variable. In Column
(1), we add State Coincidence Index (SCI) as one of the control variables to control for the macroeconomic
conditions of the state. Next, we interact Banksize with the growth rate in the state Coincident index (SCI ) and
report the coefficients of Banksize and Banksize*SCI in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. In Column (4), we
use the time-varying BRI as the instrument variable and include the state-level fixed effects. Finally, we interact
Banksize with MSA that equals 1 if the borrower borrows from at least one bank operating within the same MSA
in a given year and 0 otherwise. We report the coefficients of Banksize and Banksize*MSA in Column (5) and
(6), respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5%
level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 11: Further Robustness
Dependent Var Keep 2000-2010 Largest Lagged
(1) (2) (3)
ROA 0.084∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.068∗
(2.46) (2.38) (1.72)
IndustryAdj ROA 0.078∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.073∗
(2.29) (2.08) (1.74)
TobinsQ 0.606∗ 0.628∗∗ 0.419
(1.92) (2.22) (1.42)
Investment 0.046∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.084∗∗
(2.18) (1.87) (2.50)
CAPEX 0.043∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.076∗∗
(2.27) (1.86) (2.46)
R&D 0.010 0.014∗ 0.015
(1.09) (1.70) (1.55)
σ(EBIT ) 0.018 0.017∗ 0.040
(1.36) (1.66) (1.44)
This table presents a summary of the second stage results when using different samples. In each column we show
the second stage coefficients on Banksize for each dependent variable. In Column (1), we report the results for
the period 2000-2010, following Delis, Kokas and Ongena (2016). In Column (2), instead of taking the average
size of the banks in the syndicate, we use the size of the largest bank in the syndicate as our measure of Banksize.
Finally, in Column (3), instead of taking the averages over the tenor of the loan, we use the firm outcomes in the
year after the loan origination as the dependent variable and the firm controls are lagged by one year. Year and
industry fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. * Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.
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